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N THE WAKE of President Warren G. Harding's death and the entry of Calvin
Coolidge in the White House as chiefexecutive in August, 1923, blacks, like
the bulk of ordinary white Americans, were uncertain of what to expect.
Nonetheless, those close to the prior presidential administration, whether black
or white, had clear reason to believe that Coolidge was preeminently qualified to
carry on in the fashion of his predecessor. They anticipated his continued
implementation of Republican policies in accord with political promises which
had led to the party's overwhelming electoral victory in 1920. Indeed, Harding's
breaking of tradition to allow his Vice President Coolidge to sit with the
presidential cabinet ensured that the new chief executive understood and was
prepared administratively to deal with tariff issues, tax-reform legislation, meas-
ures for the reduction of the public debt, and the host of other political promises
Republicans made in 1920. In 1924 Coolidge, however, had to win nomination
and election to the office in his own right in order to continue the quest for
legislation consonant with the Republican party political mandate received four
years earlier.
In one sense, Coolidge's ascendancy to the executive office and his unfold-
ing, staunch campaign for election to that post in 1924 were reminiscent of the
political activities of Theodore Roosevelt in 1901. Roosevelt had aggressively
demonstrated that an individual in the generally regarded "dead end" politicaljob
of vice president could inherit the chief executive post, wrest control of the party
from its recognized leaders if need be, and make a gallant and successful bid to
become president. Roosevelt became the first vice president to engineer such a
feat, and managed to do so on the formation of a strong political coalition that
involved both blacks and whites. Coolidge's task was not unlike that of
Roosevelt, though he would have to duplicate such a feat in less than half the time
Roosevelt had had at his disposal. Coolidge's assignment, however, was
somewhat less difficult owing to his almost total agreement on economic and
political principles with his predecessor, Harding. This was part of the attraction
of Republicans to Coolidge. If the President had any major problem at all, it
centered on possible political complications arising out of the alarming innuen-
does concerning the corruption and scandal of the Harding administration. Such
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rumors had the potential of undermining Coolidge's credibility and bid for the
presidency in 1924 by associating him too much with the Harding administra-
tion.'
Coolidge moved expeditiously and adroitly toward grappling with this
problem and achieving his overall goal of election to the presidency. In the
process he shrewdly sought political support from both blacks and whites in the
South where Republican popularity would almost assuredly bring about national
success for the party in 1924. In bidding for the political backing of white
southerners, Coolidge appointed C. Bascom Slemp, former congressman from
Virginia to the post as White House secretary in 1923, and also made another
southerner, Clarence Sherill, his new military aide and superintendent of build-
ings and grounds in the District of Columbia. In the quest for the presidential
nomination in 1924, he realized their value in the effort to obtain additional white
southern support as quickly as possible. Slemp, in particular, did prove extremely
useful to Coolidge in his bid for the nomination when the white southerner
explained to a congressional committee the nature and extent of the Harding
administration scandal. He was able to convince the Republican national
convention to forego an earlier ruling that would have reduced significantly the
number ofdelegates from Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, states where
the incumbent president anticipated major support. Slemp also impressed upon
other white southern Republicans the importance of backing Coolidge for the
presidential nomination. In bringing Slemp into the White House, Coolidge, in
particular, had succeeded in increasing his stature among Southern whites. The
President next turned to the Afro-American community, equally zealous in
courting an important political friendship.2
In seeking the support ofAfro-Americans, Coolidge understood the political
implication of the demographic shift of some 400,000 to 1,000,000 blacks from
the South in the years between 1910 and 1920 (something most white Republi-
cans seemed to be oblivious or unwilling to grasp fully), and therefore appreci-
ated the potential of the black vote in key states. In Coolidge's papers is a
memorandum of9 August 1924 noting the number of Afro-American voters in
"importantstates" in the West and North. Attracting these Afro-American voters
I For cogent discussions of this question, see John Blum, The Republican Roosevelt
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Seth Scheiner, "Theodore Roosevelt and
the Negro, 1901-1908," Journal ofNegro History, 47 (November, 1962): 169; Louis R.
Harlan, Booker T. Washington, The Wizard ofTuskegee, 1901-1915 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983),3-32; Donald McCoy, Calvin Coolidge: The Quiet President
(New York: MacMillan Company, 1967),217,241.
2 Edward C. Lathem, Your Son, Calvin Coolidge (Montepelier: Vermont Historical
Society, 1968),34-40; McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, 1-30,217,241; Claude M. Feuss, Calvin
Coolidge: The Man From Vermont (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1940), 1-70.
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was the challenge for Coolidge, for they had no especial reason to support him.
While the appointments of Slemp and Sherrill counted as excellent political
strategy for gaining white southern support, they were decisions anathema to
many blacks who viewed the two men as little more than segregationists and
members of the "Lily White" faction. That faction had emerged in the South in
the 1890s on the basis of a political program excluding Afro-Americans from
participating and exercising influence in Republican party conventions on the
local, state, and national levels. The appointments were not encouraging signs
to Afro-Americans, then sizing up a Coolidge who indeed had been almost too
quiet as Vice President and was still largely unknown to blacks. Upon becoming
president in 1923 about the only virtue he had to commend him to blacks was the
fact that he came from New England, a region Afro-Americans associated with
the Abolitionis t movement of the antebellum era and with more liberal attitudes
on matters affecting race relations and citizenship rights for blacks at the tum of
the twentieth century. Yet New England had instilled in him none of this strong
commitment or determination to improving race relations in the country.3
There were reasons, however, for Coolidge's lack of interest in critical racial
issues of his day. In Vermont where he was born on 4 July 1872, Coolidge, if the
written record is correct, had no familiarity with Afro-Americans or the host of
problems they faced. His first exposure to blacks came in a limited manner in the
early 1890s when he entered Amherst College. Prominent on Amherst's campus
in that period was the accomplished Afro-American student athlete, William H.
Lewis, who after graduating from that college obtained a law degree from
Harvard University and subsequently became a follower of the unusually
powerful black leader and principal of Tuskegee Institute, Booker T. Washing-
ton. Lewis' athletic exploits while he was in college caught the attention of
Coolidge during his school days at Amherst. In October, 1892, the young Calvin,
who attended major athletic contests involving college rivalries, wrote to his
father that theH arvard football team had trounced soundly its Amherst opponents
by a score of26 to 0 and that a "negro by the name ofLewis" playing "centre rush"
led the Cambridge eleven to victory. This was perhaps the only interest Coolidge
expressed in an Afro-American, at least while he was a student at Amherst.'
In Coolidge's subsequent career as an attorney in Northampton, legislator,
3 "Memorandum on Important States," August 9, 1924, reel 63, Calvin Coolidge Papers,
Microfilm Edition, Forbes Library, Northampton, Massachusetts; Sam Marvello, "The
Migration ofBlacks to the North, 1911-1918"Journal ofBlackStudies, 15 (March, 1985),
292; Daniel M. Johnson and Rex R. Campbell, Black Migration in America: A Social
Demographic History (Durham: Duke University Press, 1981),68-79.
• Lathem, Your Son, Calvin Coolidge, 34-40; McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, 1-30; Feuss,
Calvin Coolidge: The Man From Vermont, 1-70.
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and governor in Massachusetts from 1900 to 1920, and early years as the Vice
President of the United States, he focused in a nominal and limited way on issues
of concern to Afro-Americans. The sum total of his early political efforts on
behalf of the black community may have been a ceremonial salute as governor
in 1919 welcoming home Massachusetts black soldiers who fought in WorldWar
I and his discussion on 27 April 1920 with then Boston attorney WilliamH. Lewis
regarding the possibility of forming a machine gun battalion of Afro-American
troops in Massachusetts. This latter recommendation Coolidge transmitted to the
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Coolidge's later years as Vice President,
however, did acquaint him with some Afro-American leaders on the national
level. He responded positively to a request in 1922 from Emmett Jay Scott,
formerly secretary to Booker T. Washington, to recommend a black, Butler
Wilson, for a state patronagejob in Massachusetts. Coolidge honored this appeal
owing largely to the political support he received from Butler as a Massachusetts
delegate to the Republican party presidential nominating convention of 1920.5
Later as Vice President, Coolidge had a chance to see an important side of
black life in the South when he traveled to Tuskegee, Alabama in 1923 to
participate in the dedication ceremony for the opening of the Veterans Hospital.
There he met Robert Russa Moton, formerly commandant of cadets at Hampton
Institute, who succeeded Booker T. Washington as principal of Tuskegee
Institute in 1916. Coolidge came to like the Afro-American leader as well as the
brand of educational training he espoused at Tuskegee Institute: trades and crafts
or the newest techniques in farming, all primarily in the endeavor to prepare
blacks for jobs or land ownership. While in the Alabama town, Coolidge, in a
prompt show ofsupport for Moton, volunteered to contribute to efforts to increase
the endowment funds of Tuskegee Institute and its sister school, Hampton in
Virginia. His appreciation of Moton and the difficulties the black leader faced
in the South also led to a significant show ofsupport from the White House when
the struggle over control of the Veterans Hospital precipitated racial tension in
Tuskegee shortly after the medical facilities were opened.-
5 Emmett Jay Scott to William H. Lewis, 27 April 1920, cant. 18; Lewis to Scott, 30 April
1920, cant. 28; Scott to Channing Cox, 25 January 1923, cant. 24; Republican Party
Campaign Broadside, c. 1920, cant. 28, Emmett Jay Scott Papers, Soper Library, Morgan
State University, Baltimore, Maryland.
_ Robert R. Moton to Calvin Coolidge, 17 December 1924, reel 64; Calvin Coolidge
Statement, 3 October 1924, reel 64, Coolidge Papers, Microfilm Eition; Coolidge to
Moton, 9 August 1923, cant. 86, Robert Russa Moton Papers, Hollis B. Frissell Library,
Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama; Pete Daniel, "Black Power in the 1920s: The
Case of Tuskegee Veterans Hospital," JourlUll ofSouthern History, 36 (August, 1970)
368-88; Harlan. Booker T. Washington: The Wizard ofTuskegee, 5-31.
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President Calvin Coolidge; third, Dr. Robert R. Moton, Principal, Tuskegee Institute. Photo courtesy of Dan
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Tuskegee white opposition in 1923 to Afro-American employment in upper-
echelonjobs in the Veterans Hospital led to a Ku Klux Klan march on the grounds
of the facilities to intimidate blacks then working there. In its sortie on the
hospital, however, the white supremacist group avoided marching directly on the
campus of nearby Tuskegee Institute where many Afro-American farmers and
school alumni had stationed themselves to protect Moton, the students, and the
institution identified with the venerable Booker T. Washington. In the midst of
this tension-filled environment Moton, who was confronted with the difficult
diplomatic task of maintaining peace as well as obtaining jobs for blacks in the
hospital, received extraordinary support from the WhiteHouse in accomplishing
his two objectives.1
By 1923 Coolidge, it seems, had come to sympathize with blacks on some
problems regarding their plight in the American society, but perhaps more
significant was the fact that in this stage of his political career, he had come to
understand these issues through contact with Tuskegee individuals such as
Moton, Scott, and Lewis. Like their former leader Booker T. Washington, they
were individuals who sought to profit by ties to powerful politicians and philan-
thropists in the North and South. Consequently, they turned to Coolidge with
similar thoughts when he became president in 1923. Coolidge's ties to these
individuals, coupled with his willingness to meet with other distinguished
reform-minded blacks, augured well for the President during his formative
months in office and led to a period of good will between him and the overall
Afro-American community"
Coolidge welcomed officials of the Negro National Educational Congress to
the White House in September, 1923 and listened attentively to their expressions
of alarm about the problems of segregation and discrimination within the federal
government. In October the President granted an interview to an Afro-American
group brought to Washington by William Monroe Trotter, the fiery black editor
of the Boston Guardian. Trotter had gained much attention at the tum of the
twentieth century as a major critic ofBookerT. Washington's public program of
placing economic development and trade school education ahead of the struggle
for Afro-American voting rights and crusade against segregationist codes in the
country. (Trotter, who seldom minced words, had been so outspoken on a
1 Daniel, "Black Power in the I920s," 368-88; Harlan, Booker T. Washington: The Wizard
ofTuskegee, 5-31.
• In the personal papers of Coolidge and his standard biographies by McCoy and Feuss,
there is no evidence to suggest that his contact with blacks during his early days and vice
presidency went beyond interaction with the Tuskegee-oriented men. For information on
this topic see the microfilm edition of the Coolidge papers as well as the collection of
personal correspondence located in Forbes Library in Northampton, Massachusetts.
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previous trip to the White House almost a decade earlier that then President,
Woodrow Wilson, peremptorily terminated the meeting. This made it all the
more remarkable that another President, Coolidge, would agree to see the Boston
editor.) In that meeting Trotter urged the President to continue to assist Moton
in his efforts to ensure blacks a central role in policies pertaining to the Veterans
Hospital. Trotter also encouraged Coolidge to give strong presidential backing
to an anti-lynching bill expected to come before Congress in 1924, and take steps
to increase the enrollment of blacks in West Point and the Naval Academy. After
the Trotter meeting, the President met another black delegation led to the White
House in that same month by the prominent Afro-American attorney from
Richmond, Virginia, Giles B. Jackson, who impressed upon Coolidge the need
for a Negro Industrial Commission, a proposal expected to be included in the
Delaware Congressman Caleb R. Layton's legislative bill to be considered by the
House of Representatives that year.9
From the President's viewpoint, perhaps the most significant black visitor to
the White House in October was RobertRussa Moton, the principal ofTuskegee,
who had come to share with Coolidge information on southern political issues
affecting the Republican party. The meeting was the result of a letter from Moton
to Coolidge several weeks earlier, advising the President to confer with southern
politicians Joseph O. Thompson, a white in Alabama, and Robert R. Church, a
wealthy black businessman in Tennessee. Both men, as former Booker T.
Washington political associates, had acquired an excellent understanding of the
Republican party machine in their region. Their advice, Moton believed, would
be useful in grappling with the issues of delegate support in the convention and
the possible political strength of the party in their states in the election of 1924.
Other Tuskegee-oriented political stalwarts attuned to the BookerT. Washington
dictates ofobtaining patronage positions traveled to the White House in October,
the most prominent being Emmett Jay Scott, then secretary-treasurer and busi-
ness manager ofHoward University, James A. Cobb, a law professor at the same
institution, and William H. Lewis. They, as a group, promptly suggested to the
President the kinds of black political appointments to be made, and even drafted
for Coolidge the necessary wording of a policy statement when the time came to
announce to newspapers the anticipated patronage jobs to be given to Afro-
Americans.1O
9 John Blair, "A Time for Parting: The Negro During the Coolidge Years," American
Studies Series, Volume 3 (London, England), 178-79; Stephen Fox, The Guardian of
Boston: William Monroe Trotter (New York: Atheneum, 1971),248-49; Sherman, The
Republican Party and Black America, 200-23.
10 C. Bascom Slemp to Moton, 22 September 1923, cant. 86; Moton to Coolidge, 15
October 1923, cant. 86, Moton Papers; "Suggested Statement for the President," 4
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Though Coolidge was drawn politically to the Tuskegee-oriented faction as
a whole, it appeared for the moment in October, 1923 that his doors were open
to other significant black leaders of the press, civil rights organizations, educa-
tional institutions, and Republican party as well. Thus, despite initial reserva-
tions, blacks as a whole were more optimistic as the new administration began to
take shape. An indication of their positive attitude toward the President was
reflected in the District of Columbia black newspaper, the Washington Eagle,
which opined that "much significance is attached to the easy access to the White
House which colored citizens now enjoy." Coolidge did remain open to visits and
discussions with Afro-Americans, and sought their advice on matters of race
relations. Any doubts he may have had about what Afro-Americans wanted
politically must have been dispelled by these meetings. In particular, he received
a long detailed memorandum in November from the head of the Associated
Negro Press, Nahum B. Brascher, who placed his news service at the disposal of
the President as he had done also for Harding. Brascher wrote to Coolidge,
summarizing and confirming that the issues central to Afro-Americans were
policy changes to stop lynchings, segregation in public offices, and the discrimi-
nation policies of the civil service. Brascher also advised the President to provide
more patronage appointments for blacks, extend the influences of Afro-Ameri-
cans in policy-making decisions at the Veterans Hospital in Tuskegee, ensure the
enfranchisement of more blacks in southern states, and increase the number of
black representatives in Republican national conventions. Resolving all of these
problems to the satisfaction of Afro-Americans would have been a difficult
assignment for Coolidge, but he continued to give hope to blacks that some
reform was forthcoming by his willingness to discuss these matters publicly.n
The pinnacle ofAfro-American confidence in the new chiefexecutive came,
consequently, shortly after Coolidge gave the annual presidential address to
Congress in November and opened the segment of this speech on racial reform
with the ringing declaration that under the Constitution, "the rights of colored
citizens were as sacred as those ofany other citizen" and that it was "both a public
and private duty to protect these rights." The President went on to urge the
Congress "to exercise all its power of prevention and punishment against the
hideous crime oflynching." He also acknowledged that money had already been
appropriated to give black Americans vocational training in agriculture, recom-
mended federal funds for the medical school of the predominant!y black Howard
University to contribute to the overall objective of producing an additional five
October1923, reel 63, microfilm edition of Coolidge Papers.
11 N.D. Brascher to Coolidge, 6 November 1923, reel 63, Coolidge Papers; Washington
Eagle, 6 October 1923.
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hundred Afro-American doctors, and pointed to the need for a biracial industrial
committee to facilitate the adjustment of large numbers of southern blacks
migrating to northern urban centers in search of jobs and all-around better
conditions. Concluding the portion of his speech on Afro-Americans, Coolidge
did lessen the sting of these remarks to whites by proclaiming that "it was well
to recognize that [racial] difficulties are to a large extent local problems which
must be worked out by mutual forbearance and human kindness of each
community. Such a method gives much more promise of a real remedy than
outside interference."l2
In these succinct but significant statements the President touched upon
issues that had long troubled blacks and for which they had sought solutions on
many previous occasions. Lynchings had been a perennial problem since the
American Civil War. From 1880 to 1920, some 3,112 Afro-Americans had been
victims of lynch mobs in the United States, but congressional legislative
measures to end this often racially motivated crime had been voted down on five
separate occasions prior to 1923. In 1923, the very year in which Congressman
Leonidas Dyer's anti-lynching measure was defeated in the United States Senate,
a total of twenty-nine Afro-Americans had been hanged by mobs. Anticipating
the reintroduction of the Dyer Bill in Congress in 1924, Coolidge took a coura-
geous step in urging Capitol Hill legislators to pass the anti-lynching measure.
The chief executive's recommendation for a biracial commission for easing the
settlement of southern black migrants in northern industrialized areas amounted
to an endorsement of the Layton bill, one of the goals of which was to facilitate
the transition of workers to life in urban regions. This particular bill was
scheduled to come before Congress in 1924. Coolidge's pledging of funds to
Howard University, an institution experiencing the kind of growth and develop-
ment in the 1920s which caused blacks to label it "the Capstone of Negro
Education," proved extremely soothing to many Afro-Americans who looked to
the Washington, D.C., center of learning for the much needed cadre of well
trained doctors, dentists, lawyers, engineers, preachers, and teachers vital to the
welfare of the black community. In all, the Afro-American segment of the
President's annual speech before Congress in 1923 was favorably received by
blacks who interpreted it as the beginning of new executive sensitivity to assist
them in their endeavors to improve their status in the American society.13
In the wake of his speech to Congress, Coolidge continued to welcome
12 Calvin Coolidge, Annual Message ofthe President ofthe United States to Joint Session
ofCongress, November, 1923 (Washington: Govemment Printing Press), 1-14.
13 Maceo Crenshaw Dailey, Jr., "Emmett Jay Scott: The Career of a Secondary Black
Leader," Ph.D. dissertation, Howard University, 1983,438-77; Giles B. Jackson to C.
Bascom Slemp, 25 October 1923, reel 63, Coolidge Papers.
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blacks to the White House and to discuss racial reform issues with them. In
February, 1924, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People led a coalition of black church groups and lay organizations to the White
House to discuss varying issues ofconcern to Afro-Americans. Within the group
were such Afro-American notables as the organization's executive secretary,
James Weldon Johnson; the head of its Washington, D.C. branch, Archibald
Grimke; president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, A. Phillip
Randolph; editors Robert Abbott of the Chicago Defender; Robert L. Vann of the
Pittsburgh Courier; and Carl Murphy of the Baltirrwre Afro-American. During
the course of the meeting, this group handed to Coolidge a petition of 124,000
signatures urging a pardon for the Afro-American soldiers involved in the racial
melee in Houston, Texas in 1917 where 17 whites were killed, a request the
President granted a few years later.14
Between 1923 and 1924 the alacrity which Coolidge demonstrated in
meeting with Afro-Americans proved encouraging to most of them, save for the
seasoned and cautious veterans of civil rights organizations and more radical
activists in the quest of racial reform. Chandler Owen and A. Phillip Randolph,
the two brilliant editors of the radical black journal, The Messenger, had
expressed their apprehension earlier by pointing out that "Coolidge [was] pretty
coolon the Negro question." Following his own meeting with the President,
James W. Johnson commented some years later that "it was clear Mr. Coolidge
knew absolutely nothing about colored people. I gathered that the only living
Negro he had heard anything about was Major [Robert Russa] Moton. I was
relieved when the audience was over, and I suppose Mr. Coolidge was too."
Given the provincial background of Coolidge and his political predilections for
Tuskegee-oriented black leaders, Johnson's comments were essentially correct.
More critically, they revealed what would become grave and inherent problems
in the President's style of leadership: meeting with major representatives of the
Afro-American community but ultimately coming to rely on the advice of the
"old guard" black politicians. In an era where growing reform organizations and
movements heightened the expectations of blacks for positive change, such a
strategy made them more impatient with a Republican party which showed less
concern with their problems and correspondingly took their vote for granted."
Neither Coolidge nor the Republican party could afford to remain impervi-
ous to the growing importance and thrust of black movements and organiza-
tions-particularly the NAACP, the unfolding of the "New Negro" artistic flower-
14 Blair, "A Time for Parting," 178-79; Sherman, The Republican Party and Black
America, 200-23; Fox, The Guardian ofBoston, 248-49.
15 James W. Johnson, Along This Way (New York: Viking Press, 1933),374; Blair, "A
Time for Parting," 177-99.
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ing known as the Harlem Renaissance centered in upper Manhattan (a place many
Afro-Americans believed to be the cultural and political capital of the black
community), and the extraordinary mass movement ofblacks led dramatically by
the Universal Negro Improvement Association and its inimitable, Jamaican-born
leader, Marcus Garvey, who immigrated to the United States in 1916. These
movements and organizations exemplified the intensity of concern over racial
problems and changing emphasis of blacks in the 1920s, and their determination
to bring about much needed elevation in the status of Afro-Americans in the
United States. Though these three movements were centered in New York City
for the most part, their tentacles reached significantly into many Afro-American
communities in the country and influenced black thought and behavior.16
The incipient nationalism of the Marcus Garvey-led UNIA instilled self pride
in many blacks and stimulated them to become involved in self-help economic
projects on a level more grandiose, though less substantial, than Booker T.
Washington's movement from 1901 to 1915. Garvey originally planned to visit
the United States for the explicit purpose ofmeeting with Booker T. Washington,
whose program of self-help organizational and institutional development within
the black community appeared to be fundamentally applicable to Jamaican
conditions. Entering the country after the death of Washington, Garvey,
nonetheless, continued with his original plans of involving himself in organiza-
tional endeavors for black progress and did his leadership homework accord-
ingly. Garvey traveled throughout the United States between 1916 and 1919 to
gauge the plight of black Americans. Settling later in Harlem, he formed the
Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League to
organize blacks around the world to improve their status. The Association's
paramilitary group, capitalist projects, and mass meetings inspired blacks to
concentrate on rising above their second-class citizenship in the United States or
their colonial status in countries in the Caribbean or Africa. The UNIA'S slogan,
"one God, one Aim, one Destiny," soon appealed to numerous blacks in the
United States. Perhaps as many as 400,000 individuals joined or supported
Garvey and the UNIA during the 1920s. G. Emonei Carter, the first Vice President
of the organization, who earlier had served as a waiter in a FloridaHotel Coolidge
frequented on vacation, wrote to the President in the manner befitting a proud,
racially conscious representative of an organization to the head of a sovereign
16 David L. Lewis, When Harlem Was In Vogue (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); See
Tony Martin, Race First: The Ideological and OrganizationalStruggle ofMarcus Garvey
and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976)
for important discussions ofthe Garvey movement and the Harlem Renaissance. See also
Sherman, The Republican Party and Black America, for an examination of the general
extent to which the party of Lincoln overlooked black organizations.
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state, alerting him to the significance of the UNIA. There is no evidence, however,
that Coolidge responded. Garvey and Garveyism were too far outside of the
mainstream of American life, and already under the scrutiny of United States
military officials and later the Bureau of Investigation for "fomenting" racial
hatred. In a curious twist, though, Garvey and many UNIA followers politically
supported Coolidge in the 1924 presidential election. But they would voice no
similar support for the Republican party presidential candidate of 1928.'7
While strictly an artistic movement, and seemingly innocuous on the
political front, the Harlem Renaissance was designed to claim citizenship rights
by virtue of a creative intellectual outpouring of literature, music, and painting
to reveal the beauty and dynamics of the Afro-American community. For black
thinkers the perception of that movement extended far beyond the promise held
out by Charlotte Osgood Mason, the eccentric white spinster in mid-town
Manhattan, who sponsored Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston to portray
blacks in their atavistic, "primitive African" sense. Afro-American intellectuals
such as the NAACP'S Walter White and James Weldon Johnson, both novelists of
the Harlem Renaissance, and University of Chicago graduate student and later
head of Fisk University, Charles Johnson, viewed the artistic movement in terms
of exposing the debilitating effects of racism and second-class citizenship. The
fact that individuals in the NAACP and those with views compatible with this
organization were involved in a cultural movement which featured such talented
writers as Countee Cullen, Claude McKay, and Wallace Thurmond reflected the
consciousness that literature, music, and painting could serve political purposes
and vice-versa. Alain Locke, for example, anticipated great social gains accom-
panying a "second wave" of black artistic contributions. There would be a
"releasing of our talented group from the arid fields of controversy and debate to
the productive fields of creative expression. The especially cultural recognition
they win should in tum prove the key to that revaluation of the Negro which must
precede or accompany any considerable further betterment of race relation-
ships."18
In one sense or another, the UNIA, NAACP, and Harlem Renaissance leaders
were inextricably linked together (though they too were capable of internecine
squabbling) in their thrust for racial uplift. They were indicative, more signifi-
cantly, of the growing consciousness and political awareness of the need for
reform of vital importance to the larger Afro-American community. If nothing
else, such groups made it apparent that there was a struggle going on in the black
17 Martin, Race First, 3-66; Emonei Carter to Coolidge, 8 December 1924, reel 63,
Coolidge Papers; Dailey, "Emmett Jay Scott," 299-301.
18 Alain Locke, "The New Negro," in Locke, ed., The New Negro (New York: Albert and
Charles Boni, 1925), 15.
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community for leadership of Afro-Americans, and that no one organization or
individual, as had been the case during the era of Booker T. Washington, could
deliver the black vote. Any political party depending on the support of the black
electorate needed to consider the importance of this change both in terms of the
political consciousness ofblacks and the balkanization ofpower within the Afro-
American community-something the Republican party refused to do, in any
constructive and creative manner, in the 1920s. The Republican party's failure
to consider the significance of this change or to explore wider political ties with
the Afro-American community caused an erosion of black support after 1924.
Coolidge had initiated the process of good will and appeared prepared to follow
through on it, but ultimately lapsed into dependence for political advice and
policy on the small residual group of black leaders formerly associated with
Booker T. Washington. With this, the likelihood of the President's seeking any
major racial reform policies receded into the background. 19
Why the President turned to the Tuskegee-oriented men can best be ex-
plained by the political capital to be derived from such ties. Booker T.
Washington's disciples were foremost team players in the game of politics, and
had limited objectives-viz., claiming more patronage jobs and assistance for
institutions or communities with which they were affiliated. Politically, they
could be expected to accept party decisions and mandates in the realm of race
relations without any obstreperous public show of discontent. Satisfying the
narrow personal objectives or professional interests of Tuskegee men was
generally incentive enough for them to do the bidding of their political or
philanthropic benefactors. In this sense, Tuskegee men were preeminently
trustworthy.20
By virtue of his position at Tuskegee as successor to Booker T. Washington,
Robert Russa Moton stood out initially as Coolidge's preferred adviser on Afro-
American affairs, and a key person for maintaining black allegiance to the
Republican party. Moton, however, had not sorted out in his own mind the nature
of the role to be assumed at Tuskegee: whether to till the post in the political
leadership manner ofBooker T. Washington or narrow his role to that ofa college
president interested in national affairs only to the extent that they affected
Tuskegee Institute. His reluctance to involve himself more fully in politics on the
national level between 1923 and 1928 prevented him from exploiting his
19 For full discussions of this question see Lewis, When Harlem Was In Vogue; and
Sherman, The Republican Party and Black America, 177-99; also, Blair, "A Time for
Parting."
20 Harlan, Booker T. Washington: The Wizard ofTuskegee. 1901-1915, contains the most
recentdiscussion ofthe interaction ofWashington and his followers with Republican party
officials.
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...
connection with Coolidge in the fashion Booker T. Washington had done with
earlier American presidents. Moton's trips to the White House during Coolidge's
presidency resulted in afew suggestions for political appointments for Tuskegee
loyalists, but stopped short of the systematic lobbying for patronage jobs for his
followers and other machinations to exercise any significant influence within the
Republican party at the nationallevel,21
Within the political arena, Moton nonetheless adhered to the Tuskegee
imperative of serving and appeasing powerful whites in return for favors. In
1923, while the wider black community was recoiling at the Coolidge appoint-
ment of C. Bascom Slemp as White House secretary because of his southern
racial bias against Afro-Americans, Moton refused to take such a position and
instead applauded Coolidge for the selection and described Slemp as a very
talented person. If Moton seemed out of step with the larger Afro-American
community on the Slemp appointment, his expression of confidence in
Coolidge's decision was the basis of a political quid pro quo that could gain for
the Tuskegee principal influence in Alabama where it was of particular impor-
tance to him. Coolidge indeed sustained the much needed commitment to Moton
to allow for his prominent role in the staffing and other administrative decisions
of the Veterans Hospital in Tuskegee. In April, 1926, the Tuskegee principal's
secretary, Albon L. Holsey, thanked the President forthis kind ofsupport and also
noted "that the trouble at the Veterans Hospital had abated since the White House
became involved." Moton, however, did not go much beyond this kind of
localized endeavor to exploit his relationship to the Coolidge administration.22
Another black political adviser upon whom the President depended was
William H. Lewis, who had attended Amherst College at the same time as
Coolidge. A party machine operative from the days of Booker T. Washington,
Lewis' early contact with Coolidge and his educational training as an Amherst
man combined to ease him into the seat as an adviser to the President. Lewis
managed to bask within the inner circles of the Coolidge administration for less
than a year and during that period achieved the questionable honor of shaping the
President's thinking on the necessity of "playing politics" with the black
community. This political approach, springing from Lewis' suggestion, was
directed initially at the remarkable black leader W.E.B. Du Bois, the first Afro-
American to receive the Ph.D. degree from Harvard University and the then
21 Moton to Slemp, 20 January 1925, cant. 86; Coolidge to Moton, 9 August 1923, cant.
86, Moton Papers; Moton to Coolidge, 17 December 1924, reel 64, Coolidge Papers.
22 Alban Holsey to E.T. Clark, 21 April 1926, reel 64, Coolidge Papers; C.B. Slemp to
Moton, 22 September 1923, cant. 86; Moton to Slemp, 13 December 1923, cant. 86,
Moton Papers.
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ranking savant and polemicist for racial justice in America.23
Involved extensively in Afro-American uplift endeavors and the early
twentieth century Pan-African congresses, and seeking a more global black
approach to the problems ofracial bigotry in the Americas and white colonialism
in Africa and the Caribbean, Du Bois, as editor of the NAACP'S magazine, The
Crisis, drafted scores of penetrating essays and eloquent editorials denouncing
white prejudice and hostility leveled at blacks. Du Bois' scathing words proved
embarrassing on more than one occasion to whites and blacks alike who
vacillated on issues ofracial reform. Thus in his capacity as the Crisis editor, he
already had been faced with several efforts in the past to either silence or
compromise him. Lewis, owing to his political connection to the Coolidge
administration, tried in vain to coopt Du Bois in the 1920s to ensure more
favorable Crisis editorials on the President and the Republican party.24
In 1923, during the early stages of the Coolidge administration, Lewis, in an
effort to manipulate Du Bois, craftily suggested to the President that the time was
appropriate "to playa little politics." Lewis recommended the appointment of the
Crisis editor as the President's special representative with the rank of envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the inauguration in January, 1924
ofCharles Burgess Dunbar King, President-electof the West African Republican
of Liberia.~ The appointment, Lewis explained confidently to Coolidge's
secretary, Slemp, "will ensure the support of the 'Crisis' the most widely read
publication among the colored people or stullify it if it should come out against
us." Some quick scurrying by the State Department enabled Du Bois to travel to
Liberia as a representative of the United States, but the political ruse failed to
convert him into a Coolidge backer. Du Bois, who generally remained above
nostalgic party loyalties, voted for Robert M. La Follette, the third party
progressive candidate for the presidency in 1924.26
ButDu Bois was only one target ofLewis ' endeavors to generate more Afro-
American political support for the Coolidge administration throughout 1923 and
23 EJ. Scott to E.T. Clark, 21 January 1924, reel 139; W.H. Lewis to C.B. Slemp, 30
October 1923, reel 139, Coolidge Papers.
24 Lewis to Coolidge, 4 October 1923, reel 139; Scott to E.T. Clark, 21 January 1924, reel
139; Lewis to Slemp, 30 October 1923, reel 139; President CD.B. King to W.E.B. Du
Bois, 7 September1923, reel 139; Charles Hughes to Coolidge, 26 December 1923, reel
139, Coolidge Papers.
~ Liberia was established by the American government in 1822 as a refuge for repatriated
former slaves from the United States.
26 Lewis to Slemp, 30 October 1923, reel 139; President C.D.B. King to W.E.B. Du Bois,
7 September 1923, reel 139; Charles Hughes to Coolidge, 26 December 1923, reel 139,
Coolidge Papers.
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1924; Lewis was also particularly keen on recommending the political appoint-
ments of Tuskegee men of the Washington era. Demonstrating his loyalty to
Coolidge and the Republican party, Lewis anticipated receiving the
administration's high-ranking and coveted post of official political organizer
within the black community during the presidential election of 1924. Frustrated
by the loss of this position to another prominent black in Boston, William
Mathews, Lewis defected from Republican ranks in 1924. In returning to the
party almost immediately following the election of 1924, which Coolidge won,
Lewis affected another curious volte face, but he was unable to regain his fornler
status as a major black adviser. Lewis had helped, though, to set in motion and
sanction the President's policy of "playing a little politics" within the black
community, a policy based on the offering of limited patronage jobs and other
favors instead ofsubstantial policy changes or reform in the interest of improving
the status of Afro-Americans.27
With Lewis on the fringe of the Coolidge administration after 1924, Emmett
Jay Scott became the most influential Afro-American political adviser to the
President. Working characteristically in behind-the-scenes endeavors to influ-
ence political events, Scott guided Tuskegee political loyalists who sought
recognition within the Coolidge administration. Throughout his long involve-
ment in politics from the 1890s to the 1920s, Scott learnednot to expect any major
or sweeping reforms for blacks. He did believe, however, that Afro-American
communities could expect piecemeal reforms in instances where they organized
themselves or when white politicians orphilanthropists were encouraged to assist
them in self-help projects. Scott began his career in Houston, Texas in the 1890s
as editor and part owner of a black newspaper, The Texas Freeman. He served
subsequently as private secretary to Texas Afro-American political boss Norris
Wright Cuney from 1894 to 1897 and then Alabama educator Booker T.
Washington until 1915. During his association with Washington, Scott was
recognized for his superior ability by prominent white politicians and philanthro-
pists such as Theodore Roosevelt, Andrew Carnegie, and Julius Rosenwald. He
was of such overriding importance at Tuskegee that with Washington's death in
1915, many of the black leader's followers promptly turned to Scott as the de
facto head of their political machine. Scott, in fact, had narrowly missed out in
the race to succeed Booker T. Washington as principal of Tuskegee Institute and
a major leader of Afro-Americans between 1915 and 1917. He was catapulted
into national attention, though, during World War I with his appointment as
Special Assistant on Negro Affairs to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker.28
27 See "Memorandum from Perry Howard on W.H. Lewis," 1 October 1924, reel 63,
Coolidge Papers.
28 Dailey, "EmmettJay Scott," 34-127.
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With the war's end in 1919, Scott received an appointment as secretary-
treasurer and business managerofHoward University, placing him ill the nation's
capital and political nerve center where he envisioned a role for himself as a
powerful black political boss. But after backing the World War I army officer,
Leonard Wood, for the Republican party presidential nomination in 1920, Scott
suffered politically with the victory of Harding in the convention and the
subsequent election. Having supported the wrong candidate, Scott and his
political allies were overlooked by Harding in the handing out of patronage jobs
generally occupied by blacks. On several occasions between 1921 and 1923,
Scott implored Harding to appoint more Tuskegee loyalists to patronagejobs, but
the black political leader's requests generally remained buried at the bottom of
the list. With Coolidge's coming to office in 1923, Scott anticipated that his
followers would receive patronage jobs more readily at the hands of a president
expected to be more liberal toward blacks in general and the Tuskegee-oriented
political faction in particular. Coolidge's first year in office justified Scott's
political optimism as he and other Tuskegee loyalists drew more attention from
the new President and the Republican party.29
Scott's role became more pronounced in the Republican party, particularly
in his capacity as a member of the Advisory Committee of the Republican
National Executive Council. In accordance with his rising influence in the new
administration, Scott scheduled a meeting for the President and White house
secretary Slemp with black editors on 29 May 1924, prior to the party's national
convention; there he helped to extract a pledge from the Afro-American editors
to back Coolidge for the nomination and bid for the executive post in 1924.
Scott's popularity and influence with the new administration were manifested on
another occasion in June of 1924 prior to the national convention when Coolidge
accepted an invitation to address an audience gathered at Howard University for
the commencement exercise. On the platform from which the President spoke
were Emmett Jay Scott and one of his ranking allies, James A. Cobb, a law
professor at the institution: two black politicians determined to capitalize on their
connections to the Republican party to obtain patronage jobs and financial
backing for Howard University. On that occasion both men must have been
heartened by Coolidge's speech in which he observed that: "Racial hostility,
ancient tradition, and social prejudice are not to be eliminated immediately or
easily, but they will be lessened as the colored people by their own efforts and
under their own leaders shall prove worthy of the fullest measure of opportu-
nity."'o
As a black leader, Scott had adhered to the premise in this statement since the
29 Ibid., Chicago Defender, 14 June 1924. Dailey, "Emmett Jay Scott," 236-63, 438-77.
30 Dailey, "Emmett Jay Scott," 1-371, passim., Chicago Defender, 14 June 1924.
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days of his involvement in racial uplift activities in Houston, Texas in the 1890s.
His philosophy of leadership entailed a concept he labeled "constructional-
ism"-i.e. blacks devising policies and programs for uplift rather than merely
always reacting to capricious racism whether in particular instances or more
institutionalized forms. Motivated by this view ofleadership in the 1920s, Scott
had prevailed upon Republican party legislators in the nation's capital to obtain
larger appropriations for Howard University and the subsequent recognition of
the federal government's responsibility to fund the black institution yearly in a
manner similar to financial aid provided for West Point and the Naval Academy.
Scott's ties to white Republican politicians and philanthropists had indeed
allowed him to exercise influence beyond his administrative job and responsibili-
ties as secretary-treasurer and business manager of the black university: he
became one of the leaders of the Howard clique which engineered the election of
the college's first full-time black President, Mordecai Johnson, in 1926. Scott's
activities after 1923 centered on utilization of his political influence for educa-
tional progress at Howard, and acquisition ofmore patronagejobs for his political
allies and followers.3l
Scott ingratiated himself with the Coolidge administration by advising and
guiding the President on ways to improve his executive image and appeal to
blacks. In activities long associated with the traditional means of Tuskegee men
for courting favor with white politicians, Scott influenced black newspapermen
to writer favorably ofCoolidge and alerted thePresident to the importance ofsuch
endeavors. Scott, for example, wrote the President on March 5,1927, explaining
that he had mailed letters to many black newspapers and the Columbia Press
Bureau pointing out Coolidge's actions in regards to the. "reduction of sentence
of former members of the 24th U.S. Infantry" involved in the Brownsville
episode.32
Scott, in his angling to become even more influential with the new admini-
stration, found it much easier to gain access to the White House after the
resignation of Coolidge's secretary, C. Bascom Slemp, in January, 1925 and his
replacement with Edward T. Clark, a white Amherst alumnus who did his college
preparatory work at Howard University and thus felt some allegiance to the black
educational institution. With Coolidge in the White House, Scott did enjoy more
favor with the new president as well as the Republican party.33
Tuskegee men, many of whom were Scott's closest associates, were once
31 Dailey, "Emmett Jay Scott," 318-71.
32 Scott to Coolidge,S March 1927, ree164, Coolidge Papers; McCoy, Calvin Coolidge,
285.
33 Feuss, Calvin Coolidge, 286; Scott to E.T. Clark, 21 May 1926, reel 50, Coolidge
Papers; Scott to Coolidge, 6 October 1925, reel 64, Coolidge Papers.
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again given significant patronage jobs: Charles Anderson of New York as
Collector of Internal Revenue, at a salary of $6,000 annually; Walter L. Cohen
of Louisiana as Controller of Customs, at a salary of $5,000; and Arthur Froe of
Washington, D.C., as Recorder of Deeds, at a salary of$4,000. Owing in partto
another of Scott's recommendations, Hallie Q. Brown, former lady principal of
Tuskegee and a member of the Afro-American Club women's movement,
became Director of the Colored Women's Division of the Republican National
Committee. The major political appointment Scott succeeded in obtaining for a
friend, however, was that of ajudgeship to the municipal court of the District of
Columbia in 1927 for James A. Cobb to replace the prominent black Washing-
tonian Robert H. Terrell who died that year.34
Scott clearly was the ranking, if behind-the-scenes, black adviser to the
President. Coolidge's political connection to Scott manifested itself even on a
social level when in 1927 the President extended courtesies to the Howard
University secretary by mailing flowers to his daughter upon her marriage to
Hubert Delaney, who later ran unsuccessfully for a congressional seat in New
York. (Delaney was later appointed as ajudge in New York City.) Tragically,
it was the death of this very same daughter later in 1927 that led to almost a year
ofmourning for Scott and his family and only marginal political involvement for
him during that twelve-month period.3.S
Only on one or two occasions while Scott served as the major political
adviser to Coolidge did he urge the President to seek some solution to the
problems of lynchings and segregation. And when the President did respond to
the problems of bigotry and discrimination after 1924, whether at the behest of
Scott or others, his statements often had a matter-of-fact ring to them. Worse, as
was the case in 1926 when he criticized the Ku Klux Klan (but not in 1925 when
this white supremacist group held a major march and rally in Washington, D.C.),
his response sometimes appeared to be a perfunctory political exercise to merit
credibility. The President did respond in other instances by pointing out the ills
of lynchings once again in his speech before Congress in 1925 and, in another
case, when he admonished a federal official, Winfield Scott, Commissioner of
Pensions in the Interior Department, for allowing the separation of black and
white employees in federal offices under his jurisdiction. But these cases
represented individual reactions that held no promise of any major executive
branch shift in policy or long-term directives in the interest of Afro-Americans.
What the President failed to do to correct racial injustices perhaps was a more
34 "Memorandum: Appointment of Colored Men, 1926," reel 64, Coolidge Papers; Scott
to James B. Reynold, 16 October 1924, reel 63, Coolidge Papers; Chicago Defender, 7
June 1924.
lS Dailey, "Emmett Jay Scott," 269-70.
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telling story. Coolidge, for example, decided ultimately to forego any endorse-
ment of the Layton Bill and anti-lynching measure in Congress because he feared
such support would jeopardize the passage there of legislation for the Mellon tax
reduction act of 1924. The extent of Coolidge's retreat from his commitment to
reform measures for Afro-Americans was apparent in his response to a black
delegation to the White House in 1927 when he expressed apprehension that any
support on his part to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment might
lead to a disruptive Senate filibustering maneuver hampering endeavors to get
other legislation through the Congress.'·
In many ways, Coolidge, as president, proved to be too much the pro-
business conservative Republican trying to avoid political or social problems that
might limit his ability to deal fundamentally with economic development. His
administration became more conservative and preoccupied with economic
expansion and development from 1923 to 1928, and accordingly less concerned
with social maladies of bigotry and discrimination. In retrospect, perhaps no
amount of organizational and institutional thrust of Afro-Americans could have
altered this political process, but it was easier for Coolidge to lapse into his
conservative posture on racial matters owing to his relationship with Afro-
American politicians who were basically content with the bestowing of financial
aid to institutions they represented or the acquiring of patronage jobs for
themselves and their allies."
The discrepancy between Coolidge's statements for racial reform and his
policy ofneglect ofthe overall interests ofthe Afro-American community at large
fostered an acute sense among blacks that they had been betrayed. The NAACP
gave clear evidence of its disappointment by passing a resolution in 1926 that
Afro-American "political salvation and ... social survival lie in our absolute
independence of party allegiance in politics and casting our vote for our friends
and against our enemies." The resolution marked a turning point in the
relationship between blacks and Republicans, and revealed that traditional party
strategies and ways ofwinning the Afro-American vote had run their course. The
party of Lincoln could no longer anticipate the kind of black support it had
enjoyed in previous years. This instance of black political independence and the
search for an alternative had been hastened by Coolidge's policy of "playing
politics" which underscored to blacks the neglect of their basic concerns by
,. Ibid., 468; Blair, "A Time for Parting," 182-84, 181; William Monroe Trotter to
Coolidge, 1 August 1927, reel 64; Everett Sanders to Winfield Scott, c. September 1927,
reel 64, Coolidge Papers.
" Blair, "A Time for Parting," 177-99; McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, passim, 141,306-10,
329,257.
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Republicans who had come to take the Afro-American vote for granted 38
Within the context of black political disappointment with the Republican
presidential administration by the mid-1920s, Coolidge's decision not to run for
the executive office in 1928 appears even more intriguing. The President's
statement of "I do not chose to run," while strong, still left open the possibility
of a draft movement and seems to have been a political trial balloon. Any
understanding of Coolidge's personality, particularly his sensitivity and need for
reassurance that he was doing a fine job in the executive office, reveals why he
placed his candidacy before the American public in such a problematic way. By
late 1927, prior to the nomination contest, he seemingly needed affIrmation and
acknowledgment from the American people that he had done a credible job. Had
they come forth quickly and decisively in favor of Coolidge, it is more than
probable that he would have felt obliged to honor their wish. Yet, this did not
happen, and Coolidge, in the absence ofa draft campaign, was left to abide by his
words that he "did not chose to run." There is, however, strong indication, owing
to Coolidge's activity regarding the black community at least, that he was taking
steps in the electoral interest of the Republican party or his own candidacy, given
the open possibility of a draft movement in 1928. Curiously enough, it
manifested itself in a political decision affecting the black nationalist, Marcus M.
Garvey, who had been convicted of mail fraud in 1924 and sentenced to the
Atlanta Federal Penitentiary where he was scheduled to remain until 1928.39
Garvey's followers mounted a strong effort to get him released from the
Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, including the mailing of numerous petitions to
Calvin Coolidge. In the midst of this endeavor, the Jamaican's wife, Amy
Jacques Garvey, was approached by RobertL. Vann, editor ofthe highly regarded
black newspaper, the Pittsburgh Courier, and attorney James A. Cobb, both of
whom suggested rather confidently that for a fee of $5,000, they could obtain a
presidential pardon for Garvey. It is probable that this was a scheme which
originated with the trio of Emmett Jay Scott, Cobb, and Vann, and that all three
men were depending on their relationship with Coolidge to obtain the pardon for
Garvey. It can only be speculated whether they believed and suggested to
Coolidge that he or the Republican party could profit politically and count on
more black votes by issuing this pardon to a black leader who many Afro-
Americans believed to have been victimized for his role in organizing perhaps the
most significant black mass movement ofthe twentieth century. Given the timing
38 Sherman, The Republican Party and Black America, 224; this interpretation seems
warranted also in view of previous evidence and the virtual non-existence of letters to this
effect in the Coolidge Papers.
39 Lillian Rogers Parks, My Thirty Years Backstairs at the White House (New York: Fleet
Publishing Corporation, 1961), 195-200; Martin, Race First, 14.
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of the offer to Amy Jacques Garvey, however, it is more than likely that these
issues were uppermost in the thinking of Vann and Cobb. Only the large legal
sum requested by Cobb and Vann led Garvey's wife to refuse their assistance to
get her husband released. She eventually hired two young white attorneys for
considerably less to obtain Garvey's release from jail in late 1927, some six
months before his sentence was to have officially ended. The President's pardon
for Garvey came, it should be noted, during the preparation for the elections of
1928.40
It seems correct to observe that the release of Garvey was more than just a
disinterested gesture on the part of a president. It appears to have been politically
motivated, a last-minute atonement to blacks and bid for their votes. Here once
again was a quadrennial presidential election where the interim four years had
produced hardly any constructive legislation or overall Republican party interest
to warrant political support. More specifically, the decision may have been
necessary owing to the long list of Afro-Americans standing ready to renounce
the Republican party in 1928. Editors of major black newspapers such as the
Chicago Defender, Baltimore Afro-American, and the Boston Guardian all
turned their backs on the Republican party, and voiced support for the Democratic
presidential candidate of 1928, AI Smith. Marcus Garvey, who previously had
endorsed both Harding and Coolidge, echoed the sentiment of black editors that
blacks should vote Democratic in the forthcoming presidential election. And
even Walter White of the NAACP suggested rather strongly that the fate of the
organization hinged on the rejection of the Republican party in 1928 by the
masses of black Americans. In the South also, the alliance between blacks and
Republicans showed signs of weakening as indicated by Robert R. Church's
open, "best-of-two-evils" political letterof 1928 in which he proclaimed that "the
Republican party offers us little. The Democratic Party offers us Nothing." All
of these individuals were powerful representative leaders in the Afro-American
community. Their disappointment in Republican party leaders in 1928 and, in
some cases, their support for Democratic candidates evinced the intensity of their
political alienation from the partyofLincoln. Why presidents locked in the White
House behind advisers were capable of alienating various factions and political
allies, whether they be black or white, was something which concernedCoolidge
and aproblem to which he provided astute answers in his autobiography when he
40 Martin, Race First, 3-19; Andrew Buni, Robert L. Vann of the Pittsburgh Courier.'
Politics and Black Journalism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974) 232;
Amy Jacques Garvey to Andrew Buni, 9 August 1971, Marcus Garvey Papers, cont., Fisk
University Library.
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It is difficult for men in high office to avoid the malady of self
delusion. They are always surrounded by worshippers. They are
constantly, and for the most part sincerely, assured of their greatness
.... They live in an artificial atmosphere of adulation and exaltation
which sooner or later impairs their judgement. They are in grave
danger of becoming careless and arrogant .... It is necessary for the
head of the nation to differ with many people who are honest in their
opinions. As his term progresses, the number who are disappointed
accumulates. Finally, here is so large a body who have lost confi-
dence in him that he meets a rising opposition which makes his efforts
less effective'"
99
Coolidge's judgment was impaired in a similar manner with blacks because
he made the mistake of surrounding himself with "old guard" politicians who
were a carryover from the Booker T. Washington era. And, as president, he too
came to take the Afro-American vote for granted in a decade when blacks were
demonstrating a capacity fornew thinking and seeking other political alternatives
compatible with reformist activities of the UNIA, the NAACP, and the Harlem
Renaissance movement. Considering all of this, it is still an overstatement to
argue, as one historian does, that the Coolidge administration was largely
responsible for the shift ofblacks to the Democratic party in the 1930s. Although
Coolidge's policies may not have precipitated a mass exodus of blacks from the
Republicans, he was largely responsible for the Afro-American political mood of
despair of 1928, manifested in the feeling that little could be done to make the
Republican party more sensitive to their votes and to the need for reform in their
communities. The shift of Afro-Americans from the Republican to the Demo-
cratic party in 1936 reflected cumulative black political disappointment with the
"party of Lincoln" occurring over the preceding seven decades as much as it did
the search for immediate relief from the Depression of 1929 and the resulting
economic and political dislocation. Coolidge,. however, might have salvaged
some of the Afro-American faith in the Republican party in the 1920s by a more
open and continuous response to the wider spectrum of thought within the black
community as he had done for a few months in 1923 and 1924. Afro-Americans
were certainly not ready to take the leap of faith into the Democratic party by the
4l Martin, Race First, 199-200; Weiss, Farewell to the Party ofLincoln, 9-12; Calvin
Coolidge, The Autobiography ofCalvin Coolidge (Rutland: Academy Books, 1972),241.
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latter half of the 1920s, but neither were they willing to suffer continuously with
a Republican party unappreciative of their votes and impervious to their re-
quests.42
42 Blair, "A Time For Parting," 199. For treatises on this historical issue see Rayford W.
Logan, BetrayaloftheNegro: FromRutherfordB. Hayes to Woodrow Wilson (New York:
Collier Books, 1965); Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the Party ofLincoln: Black Politics in
the Age ofFDR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Richard B. Sherman, The
Republican Party and Black America: From McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933 (Charlot-
tesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973).
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